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I. Introduction
Employment attorneys have at their disposal a plethora of hostile work
environment sexual harassment cases which span most conceivable jobs
within a multitude of business relationships over the years. However, if
you ever try to find such a claim brought forth by a porn star or a legal
prostitute, your search will hit a dead end. My speculation is that the
common reader is not surprised by this lack of litigation since the very
nature such a potential plaintiff's "work" is to be a sexual object. We have
come to believe that, in this unique situation, the employee not only
knowingly, but also willingly, assumes the role of being sexually targeted.
Stereotypes concerning the industry of adult entertainment have mirrored
our society's acceptance that with foreknowledge, in limited encounters,
and under jurisdictional regulations, an individual can sell his or her
sexuality for a price. But where is the line drawn?
There are a number of other typecasts created in response to
individuals "selling sex" outside of the warily defined adult entertainment
2009 J.D. Candidate, U.C. Hastings College of the Law.
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industry.' What about actors and actresses performing sexually suggestive
scenes on the sets of motion pictures, television shows, or music videos?
What about sexually charged atmospheres where the underlying purpose is
to be artistic and innovative? Or what about the performance of
provocative actions which are notoriously associated with sex? The
answers to these and many other questions remain unclear today. While a
handful of decisions provide some guidance into the judiciary's thought
process, blurred and ever-changing community standards seem to plague
the powers of predictability for opposing parties. The criterion of whether
or not a reasonable person would be offended by the objectionable behavior
in the workplace or would find such conduct severe or pervasive is applied
variably by the courts.
Sexual harassment has been a topic at the forefront of employment
discrimination law for decades and has received an inordinate amount of
attention from the courts.2 A sexually hostile work environment has been
and continues to be the most widespread type of sexual harassment, and one
that raises the most intricate evidentiary problems.3 Even when some of the
noted behavior is sexually suggestive, that conduct can be insufficient as a
matter of law to constitute a severe or pervasive hostile work environment.4
How courts examine the evidentiary adequacy of hostile work environment
sexual harassment claims determines whether there is a triable issue of fact to
preclude summary judgment.5 But as you will see, the measuring stick used
by courts to assess a reasonable person standard appears at times to be
intuitively, rather than equally applied to a societal sensitivity level. The
resulting problem thus becomes what, if any, common threads are
identifiable. If a pattern is recognizable, can it provide unification among
seemingly fact-specific circumstances?
The recent, controversial California Supreme Court holding in Lyle v.
Warner Brothers Television Productions6 is illustrative of whether the
pervasiveness of sexually explicit conduct is insufficient as a matter of law
or should be sent to the trier of fact. The court held that a former writer's
assistant for the popular, adult-oriented television show Friends failed to
establish actionable harassment under the California Fair Employment and
1. See, e.g., FAIRFIELD, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 10D (2008) ("Any business that, for any
form of consideration, as a regular and substantial portion of conduct offers to its patrons
products, merchandise, services or entertainment characterized by an emphasis upon specified
sexual activities or the exposure of specified anatomical areas.")
2. THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 118 (2001).
3. Id. at 124.
4. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
6. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2006).
[31:2
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Housing Act ("FEHA") . According to the court, the circumstances did not
establish a prima facie case of hostile workplace environment sexual
harassment, even though there was no dispute that sexually coarse and
vulgar language was used regularly, physical gestures were expressed
haphazardly, and offensive drawings were circulated openly in the Friends
writers' meetings that the assistant was required to attend.8 In addition to
holding that "a reasonable trier of fact could not find, based on the facts
presented here, that members of one sex were exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex were
not exposed," the court also found that the lewd and crude behavior of the
writers was a necessary part of their job.9 "Due to the nature of the writers'
work, the pervasive sexual atmosphere was necessary for the creative
process of writing an 'adult' themed show."' 
0
Since the Lyle decision has left much to be desired in the application
of what appears to be a new doctrine of "creative exemption" in the
workplace, this note first addresses the road map drawn by the United
States and California Supreme Courts. Second, this note analyzes what
courts have defined as "sufficiently severe or pervasive" when the alleged
behavior is subjectively found offensive. Third, this note discusses the
importance of whether or not the objectionable actions were directed or
targeted at the plaintiff. Fourth, this note looks to courts' consideration of
society's stereotypes in determining whether a position of employment is
forewarned of a sexual nature. Is a tangible job condition actually altered
when an employee knowingly enters a sexually charged occupational
atmosphere? What if a plaintiff willingly welcomes or participates in
otherwise questionable conduct? Fifth, in determining what the boundaries
of the "creative sessions" defense are according to Lyle, this note presents
its relevance to industries outside of the television comedy production.
Would the court allow the same vulgar language to be used by a sports
writer or news reporter or would it resort to a separate standard where
comments are to be "no more offensive than sexual jokes regularly told on
major network television programs?" ' This note specifically circumvents
Constitutional First Amendment issues, which a number of other authors
7. Lyle at 215.
8. Id. at 216-17.
9. Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
10. Susan Funaro, "Friends" Sexual Harassment Case Dismissed, LEGAL ZOOM, Jan. 24, 2008,
http://www.legalzoom.comlegal-articles/friends-sexual-harassment-case%20.html.
11. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1265-66 (1999) (citing Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also, Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co.,
50 F.3d 428, 431 (holding that, objectively, plaintiff could not state a claim for hostile work
environment when defendant did not say "anything to her that could not be repeated on primetime
television").
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have tackled exclusively in their works. 12 Finally, this note summarizes
some distinguishable factors that appear commonplace in the cases
reviewed and those findings' application in helping to better obtain a level
of predictability.
II. Background
After the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
federal law prohibiting employment discrimination and harassment on the
basis of race, sex, pregnancy, religion, and national origin,13 the United
States Supreme Court has held that a requisite element of hostility demands
both a subjective and an objective prong. 14 That is, the plaintiff herself
must not only "subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive," she
must also show that a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would
perceive the environment as hostile.15 The inquiry as to whether conduct is
objectively offensive "requires careful consideration of the social context in
which particular behavior occurs."' 16  This federal analysis has been
adopted by the FEHA, including the elements that an employee was
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment and that it was sufficiently
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment. 17
The use of sexually coarse and vulgar language in the workplace is not
actionable per se.' 8  Rather, courts must look to the specific facts and
circumstances presented to determine whether the language at issue
constitutes harassment based on sex within the meaning of FEHA and
whether such language is severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to create
a work environment that is hostile or abusive to a plaintiff because of his or
her gender. 19 Even when the conduct at issue, if proven to have occurred,
"[is] inappropriate and subjectively offensive to [a plaintiff] and could be
offensive to a reasonable person," it is not necessarily severe or pervasive
12. See, e.g., Diana Scott, Employment Law: First Amendment Defense, 5/29/2006 NAT'L
L.J. 16 (2006); Mariejoy Mendoza, Note, Making Friends: Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,
Free Speech, and Lyle v. Warner Bros., 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1963 (2007).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
14. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
15. Id. at21.
16. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
17. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a) (West 2005); Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., 418
F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2006); 93 A.L.R. 5th 47, 3 (2001) (California courts frequently
seek guidance from Title VII decisions when interpreting the FEHA and its prohibitions against
sexual harassment); Miller v. Dept. of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 88 (Cal. 2005).
18. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 216 (Cal. 2006).
19. Id.
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enough to rise to a hostile work environment. 20  "A hostile environment
claim require[s] the plaintiff to show that his work environment was so
pervaded by... harassment as to alter the terms and conditions of his
employment., 2 1 A hostile environment requires that "more than a few
isolated incidents" of offensive conduct must have occurred.2 2 Actionable
sexual harassment occurs when the workplace is "permeated with
'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."' 23 In sum, a plaintiff
must show "either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that
a series of incidents were 'sufficiently continuous and concerted' to have
altered the conditions of her working environment."
24
In reviewing a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment under
the FEHA, courts have also evaluated the totality of the circumstances.25
The Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions outcome was based on
the specific circumstances of the case and unique to the production task at
hand.26 The context in which the sexually harassing conduct occurred is
part of these factors to be considered.2 7 The California Supreme Court's
holding in Lyle relied on four key distinctions: (1) the offensive comments,
generated by a creative workplace focused on crafting scripts for an adult-
oriented comedy show featuring sexual matters, were not sufficiently
pervasive and destructive of the assistant's work environment;28 (2) the
plaintiff did not suffer a tangible job detriment;2 9 (3) no employee of the
Friends crew ever directed any sexually offensive comments about the
plaintiff to her; 30 and (4) the plaintiff was forewarned before hiring that the
show's production dealt with sexual themes, and, as a result, discussions
31about sex and similar jokes were commonplace.
According to the ruling, "common sense and social context will guide
courts and juries in order to distinguish between 'simple teasing' and
20. Blough v. Hawkins Mkt., Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
21. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768 (1998).
22. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing EEOC v.
Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Minn. 1980)).
23. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)); see also Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547,
550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
24. Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Perry v. Ethan
Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Carrerro v. N.Y. City Housing Auth., 890
F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989))).
25. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 (West 2005).
26. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211,231 (Cal. 2006).
27. § 12940(j)-(k).
28. Lyle, 132 P.3d at 226.
29. Id.
30. Id. at217.
31. Id.
2009]
288 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [31:2
behavior that a reasonable person finds severely hostile or abusive."32 But
this is much easier said than done. Once again the problem is whether the
court can make this social decision on its own or present it to the trier of
fact. While district courts are to be mindful of the caution not to determine
questions of fact, "a court must nonetheless make a determination, based in
part on similar cases which have been adjudicated, whether the party
opposing summary judgment has provided sufficient evidence upon which
a reasonable person could make a finding in its favor." 33 Accurately stated,
this court is no "hierophant of social graces." 34 Evaluation of ambiguous
acts revealed by the potential evidence in a case presents an issue for the
jury. 35
III. What Exactly is "Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive?"
Under varying factual circumstances, the courts have reached opposite
results as to whether the work environment was intimidating, hostile, or
offensive so as to constitute sexual harassment.36 Of course, this is
disconcerting to an attorney assessing his or her clients' tactics, because
actionable conduct must be both objectively and subjectively offensive. 37
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview.
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to
be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the
victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.
However, disagreement over what an objective individual would find
offensive generates a number of appeals and reversals.38
To illustrate the point, consider whether you would find "pin-up"
material, which is visible to all from a coworker's work station, hostile.39
32. Funaro, supra note 10.
33. Garone v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 448, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
34. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir. 1998).
35. Id.
36. 78 A.L.R. Fed. 252 §2 (2008).
37. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal. 1999) (citing Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)).
38. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
39. Compare Petrosky v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 72 F. Supp. 2d 39, 58
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (combination of poster in the bathroom and pinups in the lockers for prolonged
periods do not suffice to support plaintiffs other two sex discrimination claims), with Sanchez v.
City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (male police officers subjected a
female officer to a hostile work environment when sexually offensive posters, pictures, graffiti,
and pinups were placed on the walls and throughout the department).
What if it was calendar photographs of women in negligible swimwear?
40
What if your employer had a newsletter humorously titled "Pournography"
distributed to you?41 Would your opinion change depending on the type of
business being conducted within those four walls? Is it less abusive to a
reasonable person if the hypothetical office was a clothing retail
distributor? Or would it seem more offensive if the office was a teen
pregnancy center or a battered women shelter?
According to one court, if the evidence reflects that the language or
posters in question are annoying, but "not so shocking or severe as to
actually affect the psyches of the female employees," the language is not
sufficiently severe or pervasive.42 Still a different court held that even
when the conduct is inappropriate and offensive, it does not necessarily
mean that the workplace is so "permeated with intimidation, ridicule, and
insult" that a plaintiffs working conditions are altered.43 What is more,
another court dismissed plaintiffs claims after finding that the acts alleged
there were similar in scope to those found insufficient to constitute a hostile
work environment in other cases.4
Although, as time goes by and societal views on outrageous behavior
change, "the requirement that the conduct be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a working environment a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive is a crucial limitation that prevents sexual harassment
law from being expanded into a 'general civility code.' 45 In an attempt to
provide some examples of what will not amount to sufficient severity and
pervasiveness, the United States Supreme Court has excluded: "simple
teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely
serious);, 46 occasional, sporadic or trivial harassment that is not a
"concerted pattern ... of a repeated, routine or a generalized nature; '47 and
40. Guidry v. Zale Corp., 969 F. Supp. 988, 990 (M.D. La. 1997) (agreeing with defendant
that the calendar posted at workstation could not be viewed by a reasonable person as sexually
offensive).
41. See French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20, 29 (Alaska 1996) (cocktail waitress, who never
disputed she found the newsletter humorous, failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute about her
subjective perception of hostility).
42. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., Div. of Texas-American Petrochemicals, Inc., 584 F.
Supp. 419,432 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
43. Blough v. Hawkins Mkt., Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
44. Mokler v. County of Orange, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
45. Jones v. R.J. Donovan Corr. Facility, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
46. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
47. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Fisher
v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)).
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"mere utterance[s] of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee. 48
The Lyle court also recognized the lacking severity or pervasiveness
of abuse in which the plaintiff encountered in the Friends writing
sessions. 49 But where to draw this line is a common question of debate.
Again, stereotypes may play an important role in the objective, reasonable
person standard. Compare the two following examples. First, in Greene v.
A. Duie Pyle, Inc., a male truck driver's continual complaints regarding the
prevalence of pornography and sexual comments in the workplace was held
insufficiently severe or pervasive to create the type of abusive working
environment against which Title VII protected.5 ° In that case, the plaintiff
was subjected to sexual materials, such as multiple Penthouse and Playboy
magazines, at least fifteen faxes, cartoons, or e-mails, lists of gender-
related jokes, and nude photographs from other drivers.51 Second, in Bass
v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc., a court held that a
female professional wrestler's claims that male members of the World
Wrestling Federation (WWF) subjected her to repeated and unwelcome
sexual intrusions were sufficiently alleged to sustain her cause of action.
52
There, the employee felt humiliated and offended when male colleagues
commonly entered the ladies dressing room and when, on live television,
another wrestler simulated a sexual act behind her back with his
microphone near the plaintiff's rear end.53
Now looking at the circumstances in each case, would the courts have
held differently if the plaintiff was of the opposite gender in either fact
scenario? Returning to Greene, it is arguable that the hypothetical
reasonable person would be a male truck driver who would not find the
sexual comments sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive
working environment. But if the employee had been a woman subjected to
the same level of pervasiveness, the courts may have allowed the claim to
proceed. This theory is echoed in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia:54
[W]e hold that the pervasive use of derogatory and insulting
terms relating to women generally and addressed to female
employees personally may serve as evidence of a hostile
48. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
49. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211,224-25 (Cal. 2006).
50. 170 Fed. Appx. 853, 854-55 (4th Cir. 2006).
51. Id. at 855.
52. Bass v. World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 491, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
53. Id. at 498.
54. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted).
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environment. Similarly, so may the posting of pornographic
pictures in common areas and in the plaintiffs' personal work
spaces. Obscene language and pornography quite possibly could
be regarded as 'highly offensive to a woman who seeks to deal
with her fellow employees and clients with professional dignity
and without the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse.'
Although men may find these actions harmless and innocent, it is
highly possible that women may feel otherwise.
Similarly, the actions deemed reprehensible by the female plaintiff in
Bass might have lost some pervasiveness if experienced by a man. The
facts acknowledged that it was a well-known WWF pattern of practice for
intermingling in the women's dressing rooms.55 Although my search
revealed other threatened lawsuits by women against wrestling
enterprises, 56 no sexual harassment claims by men were discovered.
IV. Is Behavior Directed Toward the Plaintiff?
One of the distinguishing factors that the court points to in Lyle is that
none of the writers' comments were directed at the plaintiff assistant.57
This element has been echoed by courts in other jurisdictions as well.58 In
Bowen v. Department of Human Services, the court held that a female
employee could not recover on the theory of hostile environment sexual
harassment for the constant use of vulgar language in the workplace, absent
59
evidence that the language was directed at her because she was a woman.
The court, in affirming of the lower opinion, noted that the vulgar language
was directed at and used by members of both sexes.6 °
As there was no mention of creative exceptions in these
circumstances, one might conclude that this factor can be dispositive on its
55. Bass, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
56. Jason Clevett, WWE, Sable Part Ways, SLAM! SPORTS, Aug. 11, 2004,
http://slam.canoe.ca/slam/wrestling/2004/08/11/577986.html (Rena "Sable" Mero, after posing in
Playboy, filed a $110-million lawsuit against World Wrestling Entertainment. The issues
involved her being asked to allegedly take part in a racy storyline. The suit was settled out of
court in August of 1999).
57. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 217 (Cal. 2006).
58. See, e.g., Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997) (even if
employee was personally hurt by sex-based comments made in her presence, comments were
merely offensive and were not directed at employee); Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d
1134, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming that incidents did not create an objectively hostile work
environment because plaintiff was not the target of alleged harassment).
59. Bowen v. Dept. of Human Servs., 606 A.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Me. 1992).
60. Id. at 1054.
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own. However this is not the case.6' It is significant when offensive
comments are not targeted at a plaintiff specifically, but this is "not
determinative in the Court's analysis of the alleged hostile work
environment., 62 Generally, "sexual conduct that involves or is aimed at
persons other than the plaintiff is considered less offensive and severe than
conduct that is directed at the plaintiff., 63 Courts have acknowledged that a
reasonable person may be affected by the knowledge that colleagues are
being sexually harassed, even if the plaintiff does not personally witness
that conduct in the workplace. 64 The Lyle court assessed the situation this
way:
A hostile work environment sexual harassment claim by a
plaintiff who was not personally subjected to offensive remarks
and touchings requires "an even higher showing" than a claim by
one who had been sexually harassed without suffering tangible
job detriment: such a plaintiff must establish that the sexually
harassing conduct permeated her direct work environment.
To meet this burden, the plaintiff generally must show that
the harassment directed at others was in her immediate work
environment, and that she personally witnessed it. The reason
for this is obvious: if the plaintiff does not witness the incidents
involving others, those incidents cannot affect her perception of
the hostility of the work environment.65
A similar outcome is seen in Holland v. Pacific Rim Capital Alliance
Corporation.66 There the plaintiff asserted that her exposure to so-called
pornographic magazines (Maxim, Stuff, and FHM) and innuendos from
raunchy radio disc jockeys including Howard Stem was evidence that her
employer "engaged in a pattern and practice of creating and maintaining a
sexually hostile work environment. 67 After citing ruling precedent,68 the
61. See, e.g., Gleason, 118 F.3d at 1144 (7th Cir.1997) ("the impact of 'second-hand
harassment' is obviously not as great as the impact of harassment directed at the plaintiff');
Jackson v. Racine County, 2005 WL 2291025, at *7 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (comments made to the
plaintiffs about the appearance of other females bear less weight than the comments directed
toward the plaintiffs themselves).
62. Clarke v. Bank of Commerce, 506 F. Supp. 2d 851, 864 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
63. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions, 132 P.3d 211, 224 (Cal. 2006).
64. Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
65. Lyle, 132 P.3d at 224 (citations omitted).
66. Holland v. Pacific Rim Capital Alliance Corp., 2005 WL 2978333, *1-*2 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
67. Id. at*l.
68. Id. at *2 (citing Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003)).
court maintained that the conduct plaintiff complained of was too generic
and, once again, not clearly directed at her.
69
Another example of where the courts have used an objective standard,
seemingly based on societal views, to deny a plaintiffs claim that the
workplace was permeated with discrimination and ridicule is found in
Temple v. Auto Banc of Kansas.70 Once more, there was no evidence that
the actions were directed in any way at the employee. 71 The plaintiff only
based her allegations on a two-day car dealership sales event, where
models in thong bikinis sat in a showroom hot tub for a few hours.72
Although the court noted that "the sales event itself certainly has sexual
overtones and, thus, might be relevant when evaluating whether other
conduct in the workplace was in fact ... so severe or pervasive to create
Title VII liability," it was also relevant that no other complaints were
made.73 After citing the well established rule that "isolated incidents of
harassment, while inappropriate and boorish, do not constitute pervasive
conduct,, 74 the court ultimately concluded that the promotional gimmick
failed to meet objective severity.75
Even more recently, in Garone v. United Parcel Service, Inc., a
federal court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment when a
female parcel delivery service employee failed to present evidence that
objectionable remarks were directed at her.76 The court held that plaintiff s
supervisor's occasional and discontinued use of the generic terms "office
bitch," "Brooklyn bimbettes," and "cat fight" were "neither severe, nor
physically threatening, nor did it interfere with [plaintiffs] job
performance. Comments such as these, while bearing a connotation of
sexuality, can only be questionably characterized as 'mere offensive
utterances."', 77  The court further stated that "even assuming that she
subjectively experienced the alleged conduct as harassment, the allegations,
in their totality, are objectively insufficient to have altered the conditions of
her employment. '' 78 In response to the question of whether a jury should
decide if the statements made in the alleged incidents occurred in direct
reference to the employee, the court noted that "[a] plaintiff may not
69. Holland, 2005 WL 2978333 at *2.
70. Temple v. Auto Banc of Kansas, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129 (D. Kan. 1999).
71. Id. ("[Tihe conduct about which plaintiff complains was not directed at her").
72. Id. at 1126.
73. Id. at 1130.
74. Smith v. Norwest Financial Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1414 (10th Cir. 1997).
75. Temple, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
76. Garone v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 436 F. Supp .2d 448, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
77. Id. at 469.
78. Id.
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survive summary judgment on the proffer of a series of minor, unconnected
events and the baseless speculation that there was a wide-ranging
conspiracy to harass her.
' 79
V. Are Societal Stereotypes Forewarning?
A. Does the Nature of the Job Matter?
Courts of all jurisdictions have rarely had an opportunity to decide on
cases within adult entertainment. One might conclude that this result is due
to our culture and its understanding that certain industry employees are
obliged only to "sell sex." Since most citizens would expect a porn star or
stripper to be subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace, a jury, if
such a case came forward, could side with the employer under typecast
scenarios. But this is not to say that egregious acts would not yet astonish a
jury or judge in favor of a plaintiff, although a higher level of shock value
would be necessary.80 Nonetheless, because of societal expectations, these
cases are exceptionally rare, if not impossible, to find.81
Even when certain stereotypes have permeated employment areas to
the point where one might knowingly enter a job that is plagued with
negative connotations of sexism, this prior realization has not formally
entered into the courts' equation of what constitutes a sexual harassment
hostile work environment.82 One such example is demonstrated in the case
of Prince v. Madison Square Garden.83  Using a totality of the
circumstances evaluation, the court determined that Courtney Prince, the
fired captain of the Madison Square Garden's Ranger City Skaters and pep
squad cheerleaders, had alleged "various acts that, taken together, a
reasonable person could perceive as hostile or abusive. 84 Nowhere in the
court's assessment did it mention whether the "reasonable person" was a
79. Id. at 471.
80. See Carlo Schultz Vento, Annotation, When is Work Environment Intimidating, Hostile
or Offensive, so as to Constitute Sexual Harassment Under State Law, 93 A.L.R.5th 47 § 15
("[W]hile isolated incident [sic] of sexual misconduct generally will not satisfy the pervasive and
regular element of prima facie case of hostile work environment, in exceptional cases an isolated
incident may be actionable under Title VII if it is extremely serious such that it alters terms and
conditions of employment to create a hostile or abusive work environment."); see e.g., Priller v.
Town of Smyrna, 430 F. Supp. 2d 371, 379 (D. Del. 2006).
81. No cases were found during thoroughly focused searches on LexisNexis and Westlaw in
preparation for this note.
82. Courts do look at gender stereotype harassment, which occurs when an employer
harasses an individual because he or she does not conform to the typical male or female
stereotype. However, occupational-based stereotypes have not been formally acknowledged in the
same way.
83. Prince v. Madison Square Garden, 427 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
84. Id.at381.
[31:2
reasonable cheerleader or, perhaps, a reasonable spectator.85  Such
distinction may have made a difference in the court's assessment,
especially since the court acknowledged that "[w]hether Prince subjectively
perceived the environment to be abusive ... is a close question.
86
Although more debatable than the strength of the stereotype associated
with exotic dancers, professional cheerleaders disputably are associated
with "selling sex.,,87  Prince claimed that the Garden was "a virtual
frathouse where male executives treated cheerleaders like sex objects. 88
Examples of these allegations included that the skaters were ordered to
stuff their bras and told to lose weight. 89  They were expected to be
sexually alluring, to have large breasts and to make appearances at after-
hour parties and events. 90 Yet one might argue that these very allegations
are presupposed expectations of an adult, professional cheerleader. The
Garden's lawyer even countered with allegations that Prince was prone to
"hyper sexuality" and was obsessed with the skaters' looks, groped them
and used crass language to get them to act sexier.91 Regardless of one's
typecast though, the district court ultimately held that the complaint stated
a hostile work environment claim since the alleged conduct was insulting,
demeaning, and objectifying. 92
Another way some stereotyped plaintiffs have been able to defeat
summary judgments and avoid the sexual typecast discussion is by relying
on the nature of a job outside of the context of a sexually charged and
designed environment. In other words, the plaintiff does not rely on
whatever atmosphere might generally prevail in a sexually explicit setting,
but rather on the nature of her particular job in the PG-rated surrounding. 93
Of course this ground is dependent on whether there is a mirrored or
equivalent occupation in sex-neutral society. An example can be seen in a
Washington case, where a manager at a topless nightclub tried to pressure
the plaintiff waitress to dance in a sexually provocative way. 94 The court
found that a jury could have reasonably concluded that the manager had
85. Id.
86. Prince at 377.
87. See Dave Begel, Bring it on: The Pros and Cons of Pro Cheerleaders, MILWAUKEE'S
DAILY MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 2007, http://onmilwaukee.com/ sports/articles/ begel101607.html.
88. Tracy Connor, MSG Settles Sex Harassment Suit with ex-Ranger Cheerleader Courtney
Prince, DAILY NEWS, December 27, 2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2007/12/27/2007-12-
27_msgsettles sex harassment suit with.exr.html.
89. Id.
90. Prince, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
91. Connor, supra note 89.
92. Prince, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 380.
93. Schonauer v. DCR Entertainment, Inc., 905 P.2d 392, 401 n.25 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
94. Id. at 400-01.
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created a hostile and offensive work environment. 95 Significantly, the court
pointed out, "[w]hether or not this would have created a hostile working
environment for someone hired to dance nude on stage-an issue we need
not address-it arguably created a hostile working environment for
someone hired to wait tables.,
96
The fact that the waitresses at the club were not required to wear
sexually provocative attire may have helped the plaintiffs case. Whereas
if one of the hired topless dancers had made the same argument, the court
might have affirmed, instead of reversed, the original trial court's summary
judgment in favor of the employer. 97 The additional fact was argued that
because plaintiff knew before starting her employment that the restaurant
advertised "All Nude Review-Waitress Contests," she was subjecting
herself to the undesirable requests. 98 Although this may weigh heavily in
favor of an argument that the alleged conduct was not unwelcome, as
required to prevail on a Title VII claim, the trier of fact ultimately was
allowed to draw that conclusion.99
The same grounds would seemingly apply to a sexy-clich6d
establishment such as the restaurant chain Hooters. Even though these
waitresses understand the expectation for them to be skimpily-clad by
wearing the traditional uniforms, female employees do not automatically
sign on to be an object of sexual harassment. At least one court has said
that a reasonable jury could find that inappropriate comments directed to a
Hooters Girl plaintiff regarding her physical appearance created a hostile
environment.100
One constant that is seen in courts' decisions is that when a plaintiff
has "willingly embarked upon a career which exploited her sexuality ... it
does not preclude the subsequent withdrawal of consent to exploitation, nor
does it necessarily imply consent to sexual encounters of the type
complained of."' 10  Nevertheless, it still remains a question as to what
essentially implies approval to these sexual encounters. And who is the
reasonable person to decide if conduct constitutes "a most reprehensible
form of sexual harassment?"' 0 2  Such was the case in Thoreson v.
Penthouse International, where plaintiff, an aspiring actress, model and
Penthouse Magazine Pet of the Year, brought an action against her former
95. Id. at 400,
96. Id. at 401.
97. Id. at 398.
98. Id. at 395.
99. See Vento, supra note 81 § 6.
100. Ciesielski v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2005 WL 608245 *3 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
101. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l, 583 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215 (App. Div. 1992).
102. Id. at 218 (Kassal, J., concurring).
employer to recover for sexual harassment.10 3 Against strong dissent, the
court affirmed the finding that plaintiffs pressured compliance to engage
in sexual activity with defendant's business associates was an implicit
condition of her employment. 10 4  But looking to the facts of the case,
"[t]here [was] certainly no indication that the already sex-oriented
atmosphere in this work environment suddenly became more pervasive
after plaintiff appeared on the scene." 105  Furthermore, the plaintiff was
admittedly hired on the basis of her sexuality and was fired only after she
refused to participate in a Japanese promotional tour that was legitimately
part of her employment contract. 106 Neither was there "a shred of evidence
that she was expected to perform any 'sexual favors' for anyone" during
her work overseas.10 7 The dissent expanded on this point of view:
Sexual harassment of women in the work place is a grave
evil, and courts should be vigilant to enforce legislation
designed to eradicate it. The insurmountable flaw in this case,
however, is that if plaintiff encountered sexual exploitation,
this was precisely the goal of her endeavors from the very first
day she entered the employ of the defendants. Whatever
exploitation occurred here was self-exploitation, willingly
undertaken for monetary and other gain. The fact that
defendants may be purveyors in an industry whose product is
pornography does not build a cause of action for
discrimination, where it is undisputed that plaintiff was an
eager-and far from naive recruit. And while the majority
may be correct in speaking of a plaintiff's right to withdraw
her consent to such exploitation, there is insufficient evidence
of such a decision here. Indeed, there is overwhelming
evidence to the contrary.10 8
Justice Wallach's dissent hinged upon the fact that the "plaintiff
actively sought out and pursued a career with a company known to be a
veritable beacon of the sex industry."' 1 9 It appears that this stereotype
ultimately led the dissenter to weigh the severity and pervasiveness of the
103. Id. at 219 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
104. Thoreson at 214-15.
105. Id. at 223 (Wallach, J., dissenting in part).
106. Id. at 222 (Wallach, J., dissenting in part).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 218-19.
109. Id. at 224.
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allegations as insufficient in the context of the case, but the same could not
be said for the majority.
B. Did the Plaintiff Welcome It?
The Supreme Court has said that even when a plaintiff is not forced to
act against her will in sex-related conduct, this "voluntary" participation is
not a defense to employment discrimination suits. 110  Rather, "[t]he
gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were 'unwelcome." 111
Thus, as a provable element and major consideration by the courts, the
conduct complained of by the plaintiff must be unwelcome. 12 Drawl v.
Cleveland Orthopedic Center provides an example of where evidence of a
plaintiffs sexually provocative speech and dress was crucially relevant to
the issue of whether a defendant's sexual advances were unwelcome.
113
Evidence was admitted at trial which concerned the female employee's
sexual conduct, including discussion of her own nude photographs, dancing
on a table at a party, dressing provocatively, and having an affair with a
previous employer.' 
14
While the holding in Drawl may be good news for defendants who
believe they were mislead by plaintiffs welcomeness of alleged conduct,
the legal effect may or may not take place before summary judgment
hearings. For example, in Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc.,
the Eighth Circuit remanded the district court's finding that the plaintiff
would not have been offended by advances and sexual innuendos from
other male coworkers because she had earlier posed nude in a lewd
magazine called Easyriders, which was brought to work and circulated.' "'
After reversing the original finding in favor of the employer, the court
stated: "This is not a case where Burns posed in provocative and suggestive
ways at work. Her private life, regardless how reprehensible the trier of
fact might find it to be, did not provide lawful acquiescence to unwanted
sexual advances at her work place by her employer.""
6
Compare this to Gardner v. Disneyland Resort, where the Ninth
Circuit held that the district court properly granted summary judgment for
defendants because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
110. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
111. Id.
112. Brown v. Smith, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301,310-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
113. Drawl v. Cleveland Orthopedic Ctr., N.E.2d 924, 927 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
114. Id. at 926-27.
115. Bums v. McGregor Electronic Industries, 989 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1993).
116. Id. at 963.
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as to whether he was sexually harassed."l 7 The court found that Gardner, a
male employee, "welcomed and actively pursued" a relationship with
another female employee, Ms. Francisco. 18 This uncontroverted evidence
showed that any alleged sexual conduct by Ms. Francisco is not actionable
as a matter of law."l 9
VI. Proposals for "Creative Sessions" and Relevant Industries
Given that the specific factual context of the Lyle case was crucial to
its decision, is there room for this exemption in other industries?
Presumably a majority of those who have watched an episode of the sitcom
show Friends would be cognizant of the sexual innuendos and topics. This
translates into the understanding that the writers had to brainstorm to
develop storylines for the somewhat risqu6 themes, thus bringing sexual
discussions into the open. But if a journalist, for example, pursued a career
at an economist magazine, the same expectation of exposure to sexual
conversation would be very, if not completely, unexpected.
While the direct application of the creative sessions defense to
cinematic brainstorming for the genre of adult humor appears
straightforward, it is less than clear whether the defense is suited for other
film categories. Time will tell if other authors, including science fiction
movie writers or romance novel writers, for example, will be free to discuss
sexually explicit ideas and experiences in their line of work. In the
meantime, one can only make educated guesses based on a determination
from the totality of the circumstances. 120 And this totality of circumstances
evaluation by the courts into the pervasiveness and severity of a work
environment has consistently considered the following factors:
(1) [T]he nature of the unwelcome sexual acts or
works(generally, physical touching is more offense than unwelcome
verbal abuse); (2) the frequency of the offensive encounters; (3) the
total number of days over which all of the offensive conduct occurs;
and (4) the context in which the sexually harassing conduct
occurred. 
2 1
A case which could have possibly used the creative sessions defense
had it been decided after the Lyle decision was published, is Herberg v.
117. Gardner v. Disneyland Resort, 128 Fed. Appx. 604, 605 (9th Cir. 2005).
118. Gardner at 605.
119. Id.; See also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
120. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 225 (Cal. 2006).
121. See supra notes 28-31.
20091
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
California Institute of the Arts. 22 First-year art students exhibited in the
end-of-the-year gallery show a drawing titled The Last Art Piece which
depicted faculty members, including one of the plaintiffs, engaged in
various sexual acts. 2 3  One argument to be made is that a "creative"
environment is found in the post-secondary university setting where
individuals explore sexuality through the medium of art. However, the
caveat to this suggestion is the court's inference that the defendants did not
direct sexual comments to the plaintiffs: "Although [the plaintiffs] were
understandably embarrassed and upset about the drawing," the court stated,
"it is undisputed that the drawing was not intended to harass plaintiffs, but
rather to make a point about representational art.',124 Finally, the court held
that no reasonable jury could conclude the art institute's 24-hour display of
an unpleasant drawing was severe or pervasive sexual harassment under the
FEHA as a matter of fact.
25
Currently in California, employment lawyers are keeping apprised on
the disposition of another creative expression suit, which is the first to rely
extensively on the Friends decision.126 In the Mary Nelson v. American
Apparel Inc. case, 127 a former sales employee claimed that the founder and
chief executive of the clothing manufacturer American Apparel Inc., Dov
Charney, created a hostile work environment with his sexual antics. 128 The
allegations included that Chamey distributed magazines with nude images
and articles describing his sexual exploits, he discussed work in his
underwear and held meetings in more revealing outfits, and he regularly
referred to women using unacceptable words. 129 Since the nature of the
employer's business is creative and particularly suggestive-fashion design
capturing the appeal of the human body-defendants are relying on the
Friends creative sessions defense. 30 Most notably, in comparison to the
Friends analysis of specific type of work and job responsibilities of the
parties involved, "Chamey's comments, and the magazine images and
articles, were not directed toward Nelson, nor at women, but are part of
American Apparel's marketing and advertising campaigns."' 31
122. Herberg v. Cal. Inst. of the Arts, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
123. Id. at 3.
124. Herberg at 9.
125. Id.
126. Amanda Bronstad, Is it Creative Style or Harassment? NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Jan.
28, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=900005501871.
127. Nelson v. Am. Apparel, Inc., 2008 WL 4713262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
128. Bronstad, supra note 127.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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VII. Conclusion
Defendant employers, cognizant of the harm a public trial could
generate, often quietly settle claims in fear of the harm sexual harassment
allegations could cause their reputation. 132  If there was more of a
consistent equation formulated by the courts for employers to use to predict
what stereotypes are relevant to the "pervasive and severe" element, fewer
settlements may appear.
While the question may ultimately hinge on who a hypothetical
reasonable person would be in a similar situation, a court must also tackle
factual issues of sufficiency to preclude defendants' motions for summary
judgment. Among these inquiries are if the conduct was allegedly directed
at the plaintiff, if it changed a job condition, and if the employee prompted
and welcomed the behavior. But not one of these elements is dispositive.
To date, the most straightforward formulation counsel can use is to
compare levels of severity already acknowledged or adjudicated in earlier
cases. Although this may prove to be of trivial assistance due to the nature
of varying circumstantial evidence in sexual harassment claims, a
barometer of "similar in scope" acts can help in persuading the law in favor
of one side.
On its face the Lyle decision appears fact specific, relating only to the
adult humor creative writing sessions, but its application has the potential
to be much more widespread. Since the question of whether such persistent
sexual discussions were sufficiently severe or pervasive did not reach a
jury, defendant employers can attempt to apply this standard to their own
industries which arguably require a unrestrained level of creativity. If ever
such a case was threatened, the holding in Lyle could be crucial to protect
parental-guidance rap lyrical artists, television tabloid talk shows
producers, adult-oriented comedians, etc., to name a few. But the problem
remains: This objective standard, relating to each of these businesses and
how they are perceived by the courts and juries, will continually be
changing based on societal stereotypes.
132. See Paul Nicholas Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of
Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1157-58 (1995).
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